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Abstract—In pursuance to understand the behavior of a poten-
tial green hybrid attacker in secure internet-of-things (IoT), this
letter investigates optimal energy utilization from the attacker’s
viewpoint. Specifically, we propose a novel framework for opti-
mizing the efficacy of a hybrid attacker, possessing capability to
both eavesdrop and jam, while considering the underlying energy
consumption. In particular, we maximize the attacker energy
efficiency (AEE) in secure IoT by deriving the analytical solutions
for jointly global-optimal attacking mode, eavesdropping rate,
and jamming power. Numerical results, validating analytical
claims, reveal that the proposed green design can offer about
45% improvement in average AEE over the relevant benchmarks.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, energy efficiency, global
optimization, eavesdropping, jamming, power control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security (PLS) is a promising approach for
investigating the security threats in resource-constrained setups
like internet of things (IoT) [1], especially with an intelligent
hybrid attacker capable of carrying both eavesdropping and
jamming [2]. Along with the security, energy efficiency (EE)
has also become important from both user and attacker’s per-
spective [3]. This has led to a timely demand for investigating
a green hybrid attacker which may be a potential threat for
practical IoT applications like smart home and smart city.
Recent studies have shown interest on optimizing the EE of
jamming attacker [3], [4]. Whereas optimal attacking strategies
for hybrid attacker are designed in [5], [6] to achieve maxi-
mum degradation in the secrecy rate, however EE aspect has
been neglected. Further, decoding-based energy-expenditures
in eavesdropping and practical circuit-level consumption dur-
ing jamming have been ignored while considering energy
consumption at attacker [3]–[7]. In contrast, for the IoT appli-
cations using low power wireless communication technologies
e.g. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), ZigBee, LoRa, SigFox etc.,
active power at receiver becomes non-negligible in comparison
to that at transmitter [8]. This can have a significant effect
on power consumption strategies, hence deciding whether to
eavesdrop or jam, becomes a nontrivial task for the attacker.
We address this challenge by proposing novel energy-
aware attacking strategies for hybrid attackers using theoretical
analyses of PLS in secure IoT. Major contributions include:
(i) First-time characterization of the secrecy rate degradation
arising out of underlying joint energy-aware eavesdropping
and jamming. The key aspect is to consider energy con-
sumption during both attacker modes and propose a new
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metric called attacker energy efficiency (AEE) that can fairly
model the combined degradation effect. (ii) Derivation of a
semi-closed form expression for joint global-optimal attacking
mode, eavesdropping rate and jamming power in jamming
mode yielding maximal AEE. (iii) Practically-motivated nu-
merical investigation for validating the proposed analysis,
that includes tight analytical approximation for global-optimal
jamming power, and quantifying the achievable AEE gains
over relevant benchmarks.
II. NOVEL GREEN HYBRID ATTACKER MODEL
A. Network Topology and Channel Model
We consider secure data transmission in an IoT system,
wherein an information source S communicates with a legiti-
mate user U using power PS in the presence of an attacker A.
Here, A is a malicious, but smart IoT node possessing the dual
capability of eavesdropping and jamming, though having a
limited energy budget Pm. A works in a half-duplex mode [2]
and while eavesdropping, it turns on its receiver, and attempts
to tap the legitimate transmissions of S. Alternatively, when
A acts as a jammer, it sends a jamming signal at power PJ
to impair the legitimate receptions at U . The corresponding
channel gains over S-U , S-A and A-U links are respectively
denoted by g
SU
, g
SA
and g
AU
. These links are assumed to
be perfectly known at A [7] for each coherence block of unit
duration.
B. Degraded Secrecy Rate
The respective signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) for links S-
U and S-A are given by γ
SU
=
PSgSU
σ2 and γSA =
PSgSA
σ2
where σ2 is the received noise power at U and A. Accordingly,
respective communication rates or spectral efficiencies RU and
RA over links S-U and S-A in (bps/Hz) are calculated as
RU = log2(1 + γSU ) and RA = log2(1 + γSA). Now, the
secrecy rate RE for S-U communication under eavesdropping
attack by A [1] is :
RE = max(0, RU −RA). (1)
Similarly under A’s jamming mode, secrecy rate RJ [2] is:
RJ = log2
(
1 +
PSgSU
PJ gAU + σ
2
)
= log2
(
1 +
γ
SU
1 + γ
AU
)
, (2)
where γ
AU
=
PJ gAU
σ2 represents the SNR of A− U link.
Now, as A intends to maximize deterioration to the secrecy
rate of U , we express this deterioration to U’s secure perfor-
mance via degraded secrecy rate. This metric is quantified as
difference of achievable rate during S-U communication in
absence of A and the corresponding secrecy rate RE or RJ
in presence of A. Hence, respective degraded secrecy rate RDE
and RDJ for eavesdropping and jamming are defined as:
RDE = RU −RE = min(RA, RU), (3)
2RDJ = RU −RJ = log2
(
(1 + γ
SU
)(1 + γ
AU
)
1 + γ
SU
+ γ
AU
)
. (4)
C. Consumption Model for Eavesdropping and Jamming
As in eavesdropping,A has to receive and decode the signal,
we have followed the commonly used model for comput-
ing power consumption at receiver [9]–[11], and references
therein. For a unit block duration of 1 s, the energy or
power consumption at A in receiving mode is given by:
Pfr + ρd rA. Here, Pfr is the static consumption required for
receiving at A, ρ
d
represents the dynamic unit rate decoding
power consumption and rA represents the decoding rate of
A. It may be noted here the decoding rate rA chosen at A
has to satisfy the constraint rA ≤ RA, because RA is the
maximum rate over S-A link as available for eavesdropping.
Similarly, as a jammer, A transmits a jamming signal at
power PJ , adopting conventional power consumption model
for transmitter [9], [12]. Therefore, the power consumption
in jamming mode is modelled as: Pft + (PJ /ν). Here, Pft is
static power consumption at transmitting circuitry of A and ν
is efficiency of power amplifier at A.
D. Objective Formulation
We introduce a new performance metric called Attacker
Energy Efficiency (AEE) defined as a ratio of the degraded
secrecy rate to the total power consumption at A in achieving
it. It is worth to mention that being the decided decoding rate
at A, rA reflects the effective eavesdropping, henceforth may
also be known as eavesdropping rate. Noting that degradation
in secrecy rate caused by eavesdropping is upper bounded by
RU , rA actually characterise the effective degraded secrecy
rate under eavesdropping mode which is eventually defined as
min(rA, RU). It is upper bounded by RDE given by (3) due
to constraint rA ≤ RA. Now AEE ηE{rA} for eavesdropping,
and ηJ {PJ } for jamming using (4) are respectively given as:
ηE{rA} =
min(rA, RU)
Pfr + ρd rA
, ηJ {PJ } =
RDJ
Pft + (PJ /ν)
. (5)
For incorporating overall degradation in secrecy rate due
to both eavesdropping and jamming modes of A, AEE
η{α, rA, PJ } can be defined as a ratio of weighted sum of
degraded secrecy rate for underlying attacking modes to the
weighted sum of their respective power consumption.
η{α, rA, PJ } =
αmin(rA, RU ) + (1− α)RDJ
α(Pfr + ρd rA) + (1− α)(Pft + (PJ /ν))
, (6)
where α is the fraction of unit block duration assigned for
eavesdropping and (1 − α) is allocated for jamming.
We aim to maximise AEE η{α, rA, PJ } by jointly opti-
mising α, rA, PJ as in optimization problem (P0), subject
to eavesdropping rate constraints (C1-C2), jamming power
constraints (C3-C4), normalization constraints on α (C5-C6),
and total power constraint (C7) at A, is:
(P0) : max
rA,PJ ,α
η{α, rA, PJ }, subject to:
C1 : rA ≤ RA, C2 : rA ≥ 0, C3 : PJ ≤ PJm,
C4 : PJ ≥ 0, C5 : α ≥ 0, C6 : α ≤ 1,
C7 : α(Pfr + ρd rA) + (1− α)(Pft + (PJ /ν)) ≤ Pm.
Here, PJm in C3 is maximum allowed jamming power. Next,
we present jointly global-optimal solution for (P0).
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
The original problem (P0) is a nonlinear non-convex opti-
mization problem due to non-concavity of objective function
η{α, rA, PJ } in α, rA and PJ . So, we first propose an
equivalent transformation strategy involving decomposition of
(P0) into three sub-problems and then obtain the jointly global-
optimal solution by using outcomes of these 3 sub-problems.
A. Optimal Mode Selection
The sub-problem (P1) to obtain optimal α that maximizes
η{α} for a given rA and PJ , is defined as:
(P1) : max
α
η{α}, subject to: C5, C6, C7.
The solution of (P1) is presented by Lemma 1 as given below.
Lemma 1: The global-optimal value of α is either 1 or 0.
Proof: Depending on input parameters, η{α} will either
be increasing or decreasing function of α as shown next by
taking first order derivative of η{α} with respect to α:
∂η{α}
∂α
=
(Pfr+ρd rA)(Pft+(PJ /ν))(
min(rA,RU )
Pfr+ρd
rA
−
RDJ
Pft+(PJ /ν)
)
(α(Pfr+ρd rA)+(1−α)(Pft+(PJ /ν))
2
a
=
(Pfr+ρd rA)(Pft+(PJ /ν))(ηE{rA}−ηJ {PJ })
(αPfr+ρd rA+(1−α)Pft+(PJ /ν))
2 , (7)
where a is obtained using (5). Being ∂η{α}∂α > 0 and
∂η{α}
∂α ≤
0 respectively for ηE{rA} > ηJ {PJ } and ηE{rA} ≤
ηJ {PJ }, it is observed that η{α} is an increasing function of
α in the former case and decreasing function otherwise. Since
ηE{rA} and ηJ {PJ } do not vary with α, both can be easily
compared to find optimal solution existing at extreme points
of α, i.e., 1 or 0. In other words, assigning only one attacking
mode either eavesdropping or jamming is optimal as follows:
α⋆ =
{
1 (Eavesdropping), ηE{rA} > ηJ {PJ }
0 (Jamming), otherwise,
(8)
where α⋆ is optimal solution of (P1).
Remark 1: Noting the two possible values of α⋆, objective
function η{α, rA, PJ } of problem (P0) equivalently reduces
to ηE{rA} for α
⋆ = 1 or ηJ {PJ } for α
⋆ = 0. It shows that
rA and PJ are decoupled from each other at optimal value of
α that enables each variable to be individually optimised.
B. Optimal Eavesdropping Rate
For α = 1, (P0) is reduced to (P2) where objective function
ηE{rA} represents AEE for eavesdropping only.
(P2) : max
rA
ηE{rA}, subject to: C1, C2, C7.
Its solution is provided via Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The global-optimal solution of (P2) is
r⋆A , min
(
RDE ,
Pm − Pfr
ρ
d
)
. (9)
where ρ
d
is measured in W/bps/Hz.
Proof: As observed from (5), ηE{rA} is a decreasing
function of rA for rA > RU . On the other hand, as
∂ηE{rA}
∂rA
=
Pfr
(Pfr+ρd rA)
2 > 0, ∀rA ∈ [0 , RA] we can observe that ηE{rA}
is strictly increasing function of rA for rA ≤ RU . Therefore,
3the global-optimal solution of (P2) can be obtained by solving
the boundary constraints on rA as defined via C1, C2 and C7
for α = 1. On solving them and using (3), we obtain (9).
C. Optimal Jamming Power
For α = 0, (P0) gets transformed to (P3), where ηJ is to
be maximised with A being in jamming mode.
(P3) : max
PJ
ηJ {PJ }, subject to: C3, C4, C7.
Below, we present the key result leading to global-optimal
solution of (P3).
Lemma 3: ηJ {PJ } is a psuedo-concave function of PJ .
Proof: Using (4) and (5), it is found that RDJ , the nu-
merator of ηJ {PJ }, is a concave function of PJ as
d2RDJ
dP 2
J
=
−
(g
SU
)2g
SA
PS
(
2g
AU
PJ + gSUPS + 2σ
2
)
log (2) (g
AU
PJ + σ2)
2 (g
AU
PJ + gSUPS + σ
2)2
< 0, ∀
PJ ∈ [0, PJm]. Next, since the denominator Pft + (PJ /ν)
of ηJ {PJ } is an affine transformation of PJ and the ratio
of concave function to positive affine function is a pseudo-
concave function [13, (Table 5.5)], we notice that ηJ {PJ } is
pseudo-concave in PJ . This completes the proof.
Lemma 3 implies that the global-optimal solution of (P3) as
denoted by P ⋆J is obtained by solving
dηJ {PJ }
dPJ
= 0. Since,
it is not possible to obtain the explicit analytic solution for
P ⋆J , we apply golden section (GS) search within lower bound
P l = 0 and upper bound Pu = min(PJm, ν(Pm − Pft)) as
obtained using C3, C4 and C7 with α = 0. Next, we analyse
the complexity of global-optimal solution of (P3) obtained
numerically. In addition, we also introduce an approximate
closed-form solution for P ⋆J to get further analytical insights.
1) Complexity Analysis: P ⋆J can be found efficiently in few
iterationsN , which can be calculated noting that the GS search
terminates when (Pu−P l)(0.618)N ≤ ǫ where ǫ is the accept-
able tolerance. Thus, the order of complexity for the proposed
solution, in Big O notation, is O
(
log
(
min(PJm,ν(Pm−Pft))
ǫ
))
.
2) Proposed Analytical Approximation: Here, we propose
an approximate closed-form solution for P ⋆J for the asymptotic
case with γ
SU
≫ 1 and γ
AU
≫ 1 along with PJ ≫ Pft
[7]. Under these approximations, using (4) and (5), objective
function of (P3) can be reduced to:
ηJ {PJ } ≈
ν log2 (φ)
PJ
with φ =
PSgSUPJ gAU
(PSgSU + PJ gAU )σ
2
. (10)
Hereby, analytical approximation for P ⋆J is obtained by first
solving
dηJ {PJ }
dPJ
= 0, which reduces to φe
(
PJ gAU
PSgSU
+PJ gAU
)
=
e, and then using the definition of Lambert function [14] as:
P̂ ⋆J ,
PSgSUW(
e
γ
SU
)
g
AU
[1−W( eγ
SU
)]
. (11)
D. Jointly Global-optimal Solution (α∗, r∗A, P
∗
J ) for (P0)
As explained in Lemma 1 and Remark 1, optimal solutions
of rA and PJ are found using their decoupling for both
optimal value of α through (P2) and (P3) respectively. Lemma
2 and 3 further prove the global-optimality of the solutions
for rA and PJ . Finally, we select the optimal setting of α
out of 1 or 0 that gives the higher AEE between ηE{r
⋆
A} and
Set α=1, Find r?A
using (11)
Set α=0, Find P ?J
using GS search
ηEfr
?
Ag
ηJ fP
?
J g
>Start
No
Yes
Eavesdropping Mode
Jamming Mode
(α∗; r∗A; P
∗
J ) = (1; r
?
A; 0)
(α∗; r∗A; P
∗
J ) = (0; 0; P
?
J )
Fig. 1. Graphical description for solution methodology.
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Fig. 2. Analysis validation and insights on optimal rA and PJ .
ηJ {P
⋆
J }. This global-optimal value of α is obtained using (8)
while setting rA = r
⋆
A and PJ = P
⋆
J for joint optimisation.
Summarising the solution methodology, as also depicted by
Fig. 1, the jointly global-optimal solution of (P0) is:
(α∗, r∗A, P
∗
J ) =
{
(1, r⋆A, 0) ηE{r
⋆
A} > ηJ {P
⋆
J }
(0, 0, P ⋆J ) otherwise.
(12)
As α∗ = 1 implies only eavesdropping, therefore, P ∗J = 0.
Similarly r∗A = 0 for α
∗ = 0 since only jamming is performed.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The default simulation parameters are: PS = 10 dBm,
PJm = 13 dBm, Pm = 13 dBm, gSU = −60 dB,
g
SA
= g
AU
= −70 dB, σ2 = −100 dBm, ν = 0.7,
Pft = Pfr = −0.33 dBm, ρd = −10.33 dBm/bps/Hz as the
decoding power consumption per unit rate at A considering
Mica2 mote and CC-1000 transceiver to represent low power
IoT system [9], [10] and references therein.
First, through Fig. 2(a), we explore the optimal eaves-
dropping performance by investigating the nature of r⋆A for
different values of RDE and
Pm
ρ
d
in bps/Hz by varying Pfrρ
d
.
The impact of different parameters can be categorized into
two cases: (i) RDE ≥
Pm
ρ
d
, (ii) RDE <
Pm
ρ
d
. For case (i), r⋆A
follows increasing trend with Pm and decreasing with Pfr for a
given ρ
d
. A significant drop is observed in r⋆A beyond
Pfr
ρ
d
= 10
for the typical values, because higher values of Pfr relative to
ρ
d
help to reduce r⋆A significantly. For case (ii), r
⋆
A becomes
independent of Pm and depends on Pfr for a given ρd only for
Pfr
ρ
d
> Pmρ
d
− RDE . Otherwise r
⋆
A remains equal to RDE due
to boundary constraints. For instance, with Pmρ
d
= 100 and
RDE = 50 in Fig. 2(a), r
⋆
A remains equal to RDE till
Pfr
ρ
d
≤ 50.
Later on, it decreases with Pfr for given ρd .
Next, via Fig 2(b), we investigate the optimal jamming and
validate the pseudo-concavity of AEE ηJ {PJ } in PJ for
different values of Pft in dBm and channel gains ratio. Here,
g
SU
is kept fixed and only g
AU
is varied. We note that ηJ {PJ }
decreases with increased Pft because the latter leads to higher
4Fig. 3. Optimal mode switching based on ηE{r
⋆
A} and ηJ {P
⋆
J }.
Fig. 4. Performance gain of proposed optimization over benchmark.
power consumption. Also, the underlying P ⋆J moves closer to
PJm for further enhancement of secrecy degradation owing to
its reduced impact on power consumption. Similarly, ηJ {PJ }
decreases with decreased g
AU
due to reduced degraded secrecy
rate and P ⋆J increases to strengthen the A-U link. Results also
show that static power consumption has a significant impact
in addition to channel parameters on ηJ {P
⋆
J } and hence, the
former cannot be ignored unlike existing literature did.
Now we would like to provide novel insights on the
optimal mode switching at A depending on power con-
sumption and channel parameters. We can note from (12)
that ηE{r
⋆
A} and ηJ {P
⋆
J } are deciding factors for optimal
mode switching, and joint optimal AEE can be calculated as:
η(α∗, r∗A, P
∗
J ) = max(ηE{r
⋆
A}, ηJ {P
⋆
J }). Thus, ηE{r
⋆
A} and
ηJ {P
⋆
J } are plotted in Fig. 3 for different values of channel
gain ratio, ν and ρ
d
. We observe that there exists a switching
threshold value of ρ
d
, below which ηE{r
⋆
A} is greater than
ηJ {P
⋆
J } resulting in eavesdropping mode as optimal one.
Otherwise, for Pd values higher than this threshold, jamming
is selected as the optimal mode. Results show that for a
lower efficiency jammer with ν = 0.1, the channel conditions
{
g
SU
g
SA
=
g
SU
g
AU
} = {10, 100} lead to eavesdropping being
the optimal mode for ρ
d
< {−7.5,−3.5}dBm, respectively.
However, for an efficient jammer with ν = 0.7, this switching
threshold value decreases to {−10.5,−7.42}dBm for {
g
SU
g
SA
=
g
SU
g
AU
} = {10, 100}, respectively. Thus, lower A’s channel
gains (g
SA
, g
AU
) favor eavesdropping, whereas higher ρ
d
and
ν values favor jamming.
Finally, in Fig. 4, we compare the average AEE performance
of three optimization schemes i) optimal eavesdropping (P2)
ii) optimal jamming (P3), and iii) joint optimization (P0)
against a fixed benchmark scheme with α = 0.5, PJ = 0
dBm and rA = min
(
log2 (1 + γSA) ,
Pm−Pfr
ρ
d
)
which is max-
imum possible eavesdropping rate. The average percentage
(%) improvement is calculated by first analyzing % gain in
optimal AEE for different values of each parameter (ν, ρ
d
,
Pm,
g
SU
g
SA
,
g
SU
g
AU
) in its acceptable range and then taking mean
over these respective gain values. The corresponding average
% improvement in AEE are plotted for different parameters
by varying ν from 10% to 90%, ρ
d
from −20 dBm/bit to 0
dBm/bit, Pm from 0 dBm to 13 dBm,
g
SU
g
SA
and
g
SU
g
AU
from 1
to 1000. The average % improvement as provided by optimal
eavesdropping, jamming and joint schemes are 29.5%, 31.5%,
45% respectively. It is to be noted that with PJ > 0 dBm
in fixed benchmark scheme, the average percentage gain in
AEE provided by proposed optimization schemes would have
been even more higher. Thus, the joint optimization provides
a significant improvement in AEE over benchmark scheme,
and in general, the optimal jamming is a better semi-adaptive
scheme as compared to optimal eavesdropping.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have derived the jointly global-optimal attacking mode
selection and resource allocation for maximizing the AEE.
Numerical investigations validate the key metric characterizing
the non-trivial mode switching based solution methodology
(c.f. Fig. 1) for solving the otherwise non-convex problem.
Significant improvement of 45% in average AEE is achieved
using proposed joint optimization over the benchmark.
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